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reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. We start
from a linear Cournot model to motivate our more general reduced-
form framework. For this general framework, we establish the follow-
ing main results: First, vertical integration increases own investment
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1 Introduction
There is an extensive theoretical literature on endogenous vertical integration
in successive oligopoly. This literature has addressed two key issues: (i) What
will the industry’s vertical structure look like in equilibrium? Specifically, in
a setting where upstream and downstream firms are symmetric initially, can
we expect an asymmetric vertical structure with integrated and separating
firms coexisting? (ii) What are the relations among industry structure and
performance? Particularly, should antitrust authorities be wary of asymmet-
ric market structure?
As yet, no consensus seems to have emerged. While game-theoretic work
has demonstrated that asymmetric vertical market structure may arise en-
dogenously (see, e.g., Ordover et al. 1990, Elberfeld 2002, Jansen 2003, and
Dufeu 2004), there is considerable debate about the robustness of this result.
This is reflected in a recent paper by Buehler and Schmutzler (2005), who
argue that there are good reasons why vertical integration decisions tend to
be strategic substitutes, but also emphasize potential countereffects.
Interestingly, this literature has paid little attention to the interplay of
vertical integration and investment in R&D. At the same time, the volumi-
nous R&D literature has rarely focused on the links between investment in
R&D and vertical market structure. In fact, we are aware of only two re-
cent contributions focusing on the interplay of vertical market structure and
investment decisions in successive oligopoly. Comparing given vertical struc-
tures, Banerjee and Lin (2003) show that downstream oligopolists may invest
more in cost-reducing R&D than a downstream monopolist. Intuitively, the
result follows from the output-enhancing effect of R&D, which allows the up-
stream monopoly to raise the input price, raising rivals’ costs. Allowing for
endogenous vertical integration, Brocas (2003) highlights that, in the case of
upstream-innovation, endogenous vertical integration modifies the incentives
to invest in R&D.
In the present paper, we extend previous research along three dimensions.
First, we show that endogenous vertical integration modifies the incentives
for cost-reducing investment in the downstreammarket. More specifically, we
demonstrate that a firm’s vertical integration increases its own incentive to
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invest into improving its efficiency but decreases the competitor’s incentive
to do so. The latter effect on the competitor–the intimidation effect of
vertical integration–implies that there is a strategic incentive to integrate
vertically. Put differently, vertical integration may serve as a top dog strategy
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1984) geared towards tapering the competitor’s cost-
reducing investments.
Second, we show that the strategic integration incentive is likely to be
larger for a firm facing a separated competitor than for a firm facing an inte-
grated competitor due to demand/mark-up complementarities in the product
market. As a result, asymmetric equilibria typically involve integrated firms
that invest more into efficiency than their separated counterparts. Put dif-
ferently, our analysis suggests that, in asymmetric equilibria, we are likely
to observe large integrated and small separated firms. This finding is in
line with the market structure of a number of vertically-related industries
documented in the literature.1
Third, our analysis sheds new light on the discussion of endogenous mar-
ket dominance. A large literature uses dynamic investment models suggest-
ing how such dominance may emerge in a setting where there are initially
small differences between a leader and a laggard.2 Specific emphasis is placed
on the idea that leaders with low costs (and thus high demand) often have
stronger incentives to reduce their costs even further because this is more
worthwhile, given their high demand. Even though the present paper treats
only one period of the investment game explicitly, it suggests a mechanism by
which integration can create the asymmetry between a leader and a laggard:
Without vertical integration, our firms would always choose identical invest-
ment levels and thus remain symmetric. The binary nature of the integration
decision changes this, as it makes asymmetric industry structures possible,
which are then reinforced by the cost-reducing investment decisions.
1These include the oil industry (Bindemann 1999), the beer industry in the UK (Slade
1998a), the gasoline retail market in Vancouver (Slade 1998b), the US cable televi-
sion industry (Waterman and Weiss 1996, Chipty 2001), the Mexican footwear industry
(Woodruff 2002) and the UK package holiday industry (European Commission 1999).
2This has been discussed for incremental investment games (Flaherty 1980), learning-
by-doing models (Cabral and Riordan 1994) or switching cost models (Beggs and Klem-
perer 1992); Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide an integrated approach.
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We establish our results in a framework where two downstream firms face
at least two upstream suppliers. To produce one unit of the final product,
downstream firms require one unit of an intermediate good produced by up-
stream firms. Downstream marginal costs consist of the costs of obtaining
the intermediate good plus the costs of transforming the intermediate good
into the final product. Initially, all firms are vertically separated. In stage
1, downstream firms decide whether to integrate backwards by acquiring a
supplier, thereby getting access to the intermediate good at marginal costs.
In stage 2, downstream firms can invest into reducing the costs of transform-
ing the intermediate good into the final product, thereby increasing their
transformation efficiency. In stage 3, the wholesale price is determined at
which separated downstream firms are supplied. In stage 4, product market
competition takes place.
We treat stages 3 and 4 in reduced form, working with a set of assumptions
that serve to illustrate the idea that integration decisions and investment
decisions interact. Specifically, we assume that a firm’s integration decreases
own costs and increases rivals’ costs. Intuitively, this assumption on the
effects of integration reflects the presence of efficiency effects and foreclosure
effects. As we shall argue in Section 3.2, these effects have been identified in
the literature as plausible consequences of vertical integration, even though
they must not necessarily arise either in the real world or in theoretical
models.3 In any case, the presence of efficiency and foreclosure effects is
sufficient, but not necessary as a justification of our assumption. If, contrary
to our assumptions vertical integration were to increase own costs and to
decrease rivals costs (or leave them unaffected), the opposite mechanisms
would arise: There would be a strategic reason to refrain from integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss
a special Cournot example to set the stage. In section 3, we present the main
results for our more general reduced-form model. Section 4 concludes.
3For instance, vertical integration will often reduce both demand and supply on the
upstream market, with ambiguous effect on the upstream price. As a result, foreclosure
effects will not necessarily occur in successive oligopoly models.
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2 An Introductory Cournot Example
To motivate our reduced-form analysis below, we modify the linear Cournot
model proposed by Salinger (1988) to allow for endogenous decisions on in-
tegration and cost-reducing investment by downstream firms. Note that the
example is of purely introductory nature and will be generalized in Section
3.
2.1 The Set-up
Initially, there is full vertical separation with two upstream firms and two
downstream firms. To produce one unit of the final product, downstream
firms require one unit of the intermediate good provided by upstream firms.
Before going into details, we give an overview of the time structure of the
game (see Figure 1).
V 1,V2
stage 1
Y 1,Y2
stage 2
w 1,w 2
stage 3
1, 2
stage 4
 
Figure 1: Time structure of the game
Overview. In stage 1, downstream firms simultaneously decide whether
to integrate backwards by acquiring one of the upstream firms. The deci-
sion of firm i = 1, 2 is summarized in a variable Vi such that Vi = 1 if it
integrates and Vi = 0 if it remains separated. In stage 2, downstream firms
simultaneously carry out cost-reducing investments Yi at cost K(Yi) = kY 2i ,
thereby determining the efficiency at which the intermediate good is trans-
formed into the final product. In stage 3, any remaining separated upstream
firms set wholesale prices or quantities for the downstream market, resulting
in marginal costs wi ≥ 0 for obtaining the intermediate good. In stage 4,
downstream firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. We now
consider each of the four stages, in turn.
Stage 4. In the product market, firms face a linear inverse demand
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curve P (Q) = a − Q, with Q = q1 + q2 and a > 0. As will become
clear below, the firms’ activities in stages 1, 2 and 3 determine the mar-
ginal costs ci of downstream firms in stage 4, where they obtain the profits
Πi = (a− 2ci + cj)2 /9, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Stage 3. Assuming that the marginal cost of producing the input is
constant and normalized to zero, wi is the marginal cost of producing the in-
termediate good for an integrated firm, and the equilibrium upstream price
faced by a separated downstream firm. Depending on the integration de-
cisions V =(V1, V2), this upstream price is either set directly by a single
upstream firm or results from upstream competition between separated up-
stream firms in stage 3.4 Obviously, stage 3 is irrelevant if both firms are
vertically integrated: If V = (1, 1), the costs of obtaining the input are given
exogenously as wi = 0, i = 1, 2, by assumption. However, if V = (1, 0) or
V = (0, 1), the remaining separated upstream firm sets the monopoly price
for the separated downstream firm; only for the integrated firm is wi = 0. If
V = (0, 0), separated upstream firms compete à la Cournot.
Stage 2. In the investment stage, both firms initially have identical
transformation costs t. Denoting the efficiency improvement for the subgame
V as Yi (V), ex post transformation costs are ti = t − Yi (V) , and firm i’s
marginal costs are thus given by ci = wi + ti = wi + t− Yi (V) .
Stage 1. In the integration stage, downstream firms can acquire an up-
stream firm at fixed cost F . Let wi (V,Y) denote the equilibrium choice of
wi in subgame (V,Y) and the resulting level of ci as ci (V,Y). Thus, down-
stream firms choose Vi ∈ {0, 1} so as to maximize Πi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y))−
ViF .
We now proceed to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
2.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In the first three stages, the subgame perfect equilibrium gives rise to inte-
gration decisions V, efficiency levels Yi (V) and input prices wi (V,Y). As
4Like much of the related literature, we are abstracting in this example from the possi-
bility that integrated firms also sell the intermediate input on the wholesale market. Our
more general approach in Section 3 allows for such a possibility.
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to stage 4, we use Qi (V,Y) to denote downstream outputs for arbitrary
integration vectors V and efficiency levels Y, assuming that marginal down-
stream costs are ci (V,Y) = wi (V,Y) + t − Yi(V). Similarly, we write
the equilibrium mark-ups and profits of downstream firms as Mi(V,Y) and
Πi(V,Y), respectively.
Table 1 describes the subgame equilibrium for the three market configura-
tions V = (0, 0), V = (1, 0) and V = (1, 1) and the associated reference con-
figurations where firms are not allowed to invest (i.e. Y = (Y1, Y2) = (0, 0) by
assumption). Equilibrium quantities are given as functions of the efficiency
levels Y (and of k where appropriate). Throughout, α ≡ a− t is a measure
of market size. Table 2 summarizes the results for the special case k = 1.
We now highlight some properties of the linear Cournot example that will
be useful for our more general analysis below.
<Tables 1 and 2 around here>
2.2.1 Investments Under Asymmetric Vertical Structure
First, we compare the investments of integrated and separated firms in the
same market. Thus, we consider the asymmetric vertical market structure
V = (1, 0). Figure 2a) depicts the optimal investment levels Y1 and Y2 as
functions of the cost parameter k, fixing α = 1. Figure 2b) shows the result-
ing market shares s1 and s2 = 1 − s1, respectively. Clearly, the integrated
firm 1 invests more and has a higher market share than the separated firm
2.
<Figure 2 around here>
To put the result into perspective, consider output decisions when firms
are unable to invest into cost reduction (or equivalently, k → ∞). Figure
2b) indicates that even when firms cannot invest into cost reduction, the
market share of the integrated firm is higher than that of the separated firm,
i.e. s1(Y1 = 0, Y2 = 0) > 0.5. This reflects the simple fact that the integrated
firm has lower marginal costs than the separated firm due to the elimination
of a mark-up at the upstream level. However, this is not the end of the
story: If firms can invest into cost reduction, the gap between the two firms
7
widens, since the integrated firm invests more than the separated firm (see
Figure 2b)). Why the integrated firm invests more than the separated firm
is not quite as obvious. In Section 3, we will show that the intuition for this
result becomes clearer in a more general model. We summarize our results
for V = (1, 0) as follows:
Observation 1 In the linear Cournot example with V = (1, 0), the inte-
grated firm has higher output, mark-up and market share than the separated
firm, even if efficiency levels are exogenous and identical. If investment levels
are endogenous, the integrated firm invests more and the differences in
outputs, mark-ups and market shares increase.
2.2.2 Investments when Vertical Structure Changes
In Observation 1, we considered the investment behavior of integrated and
separated firms for a fixed asymmetric vertical market structure V = (1, 0).
This comparison was natural to understand the relation between integration
and market share. However, it is also important to understand how changes
in vertical structure affect the firms’ investment behavior. Table 2 indicates
that starting from V = (0, 0), firm 1’s vertical integration increases own
investment and decreases firm 2’s investment.5 Starting from V = (1, 0),
firm 2’s integration has similar effects on investments. The adverse effect on
the competitor’s investment is what we call the intimidation effect of vertical
integration. We summarize these findings as follows:
Observation 2 In the linear Cournot example, a firm’s vertical integration
increases its own investments and decreases the competitor’s invest-
ments (intimidation effect).
2.2.3 Asymmetric Integration Equilibria
Next, we consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game. In
particular, we show that there always exist suitable values of F such that
5More specifically, firm 1’s investment increases by ∆Y1 = 0.206α, whereas firm 2’s
investment decreases by ∆Y2 = −0.117α.
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vertical integration decisions are asymmetric. To this end, reconsider Table
2. For k = 1, this table lists the equilibrium profits for the subgames starting
in stage 2, net of investment costs, Π∗i (V) = Πi (V,Y(V)). It is straightfor-
ward to calculate firm i’s integration incentive ∆∗iΠ (Vj), which is the profit
differential resulting from integration if the competitor’s integration status
is Vj. The table shows that
∆∗1Π (0) ≡ Π∗1 (1, 0)−Π∗1 (0, 0) = 0.214α2;
∆∗1Π (1) ≡ Π∗1 (1, 1)−Π∗1 (0, 1) = 0.089α2.
Thus, we immediately obtain our first result for the linear Cournot example.
Result 1 In the linear Cournot example, the subgame perfect equilibrium
involves asymmetric vertical integration for suitable levels of fixed ac-
quisition costs (0.214α2 ≥ F ≥ 0.089α2) .
We now show that cost-reducing investments are important for explaining
asymmetric vertical integration. To this end, we consider a setting where
firms are not allowed to invest into cost-reduction. We define
∆NI1 Π (V2) ≡ Π1 (1, V2;0)−Π1 (0, V2;0) ,
and similarly for ∆NI2 Π (V1), where the superscript indicates “No Invest-
ment”. Table 2 shows that
∆NIi Π (0) = 0.133α2 < ∆∗1Π (0) ; ∆NIi Π (1) = 0.083α2 < ∆∗1Π (1) .
Therefore, asymmetric integration is also possible without the investment
stage; however, the relevant interval is much smaller (0.133α2 ≥ F ≥ 0.083α2).
Compared with a game without investments, integration incentives are higher
if firms can make cost-reducing investments, and this effect is much more pro-
nounced when competitors are separated. We thus obtain the second result
for the Cournot example.
Result 2 In the linear Cournot example, the subgame perfect equilibrium
involves asymmetric vertical integration for a larger range of parameters
than for a reference game without investment.
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Result 2 is our main result for the Cournot example. It highlights the links
between integration and investment decisions and relates to the intimidation
effect of integration identified in Observation 2. Apparently, a firm that faces
a separated competitor gains more from influencing investment decisions by
vertical integration than a firm that faces an integrated competitor. Thereby,
the strategic substitutes property of integration decisions–which holds that
a competitor’s decision to integrate decreases own integration incentives–
becomes more pronounced.
We now proceed to a more general framework to improve our understand-
ing of this mechanism.
3 A Reduced Form Model
In this section, we show how the results from Section 2 generalize beyond
the linear Cournot model and clarify the intuition behind these results. To
do so, we adopt an analytical framework similar to Buehler and Schmutzler
(2005). However, here we add another stage to the game where downstream
firms decide endogenously about cost-reducing investment.
3.1 Assumptions
Rather than explicitly considering all four stages of the game (as in the
Cournot example), we now focus on stages 1 and 2; stages 3 and 4 are
treated in reduced form. We still assume that, initially, there are two identical
separated downstream firms. However, we now allow that there are s ≥ 2
identical separated upstream firms.
Recall that in stage 1, downstream firms simultaneously decide whether
to take over one of the upstream suppliers, (Vi = 1 if they do, Vi = 0
otherwise, i = 1, 2). We suppose that the acquisition costs are given by a
constant F > 0. In stage 2, firms choose cost-reducing investments. We now
assume that reducing costs by Yi involves investment costs of Ki (Yi) , which
are increasing in Yi. To model stages 3 and 4 in reduced form, we make the
following assumptions.
10
Assumption 1 The firms’ decisions in stages 1 and 2 result in unique input
prices, wi (V,Y) , i = 1, 2. Therefore, marginal costs are
ci (V,Y) = wi (V,Y) + t− Yi.
For given marginal costs ci, i = 1, 2, downstream competition must satisfy
the next assumption.
Assumption 2 For every cost vector c =(c1, c2), there exists a unique prod-
uct market equilibrium resulting in outputs qi (c), prices pi (c) , mark-ups
mi (c) = pi (c)− ci, and profits πi (c), respectively, such that
πi (c) = qi (c) ·mi (c) .
The functions qi (c), mi (c) and thus πi (c) are non-increasing in ci and non-
decreasing in cj.
Assumption 2 holds for many standard oligopoly models. Using Assump-
tion 2, equilibrium product market profits Πi as well as mark-ups Mi and
outputs Qi are functions of the firms’ vertical structures and efficiency levels:
Notation 1 For i = 1, 2, j 6= i, we denote equilibrium downstream profits,
mark-ups and quantities, respectively, as
Πi (V,Y) = πi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)) ; (1)
Mi (V,Y) = mi(c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)); (2)
Qi (V,Y) = qi(c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)). (3)
We require that profits satisfy the following symmetry condition, which
obviously holds in the Cournot case.
Assumption 3 Product market profits are exchangeable, i.e. for all V 0, V 00 ∈
{0, 1} and Y 0, Y 00 ∈ [0,∞),
Π1 (V 0, V 00, Y 0, Y 00) = Π2 (V 00, V 0, Y 00, Y 0) .
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Our next assumption is crucial. It states relations between vertical struc-
ture and outputs and mark-ups, respectively, which are satisfied in the linear
Cournot model.
Assumption 4 The firms’ mark-ups and outputs satisfy the following con-
ditions:
(i) M1 (1, 0;Y) > M1 (0, 1;Y) ;Q1 (1, 0;Y) > Q1 (0, 1;Y)
(ii) M2 (0, 1;Y) > M2 (1, 0;Y) ;Q2 (0, 1;Y) > Q2 (1, 0;Y)
Assumption 4 compares the mark-ups and outputs of an integrated firm
facing a separated competitor with those of a separated firm facing an in-
tegrated competitor. Part (i) can be justified by reference to (2) and (3),
which show that an increase in V1 and a decrease in V2 will affect Q1 and
M1 via c1 and c2. More specifically, starting from V = (0, 1), suppose firm
1 integrates, resulting in V = (1, 1). Our earlier discussion suggests that
this reduces c1 by eliminating the upstream mark-up or benefiting from tech-
nical efficiencies. As firm 2 is integrated and therefore supplies itself with
the intermediate good, there is no effect on firm 2’s cost. The only effect
of moving from V = (0, 1) to V = (1, 1) on firm 1’s mark-up and output is
thus a reduction of firm 1’s marginal cost, which should be unambiguously
positive. Next, compare V = (1, 1) and V = (1, 0). Arguing as before, the
costs of firm 1 should be unaffected and firm 2’s costs should increase. If firm
1’s mark-up and output are increasing in the competitor’s costs, they should
therefore increase. Combining the two steps, we get part (i) of Assumption
4. The argument for part (ii) is analogous.
Our last assumption concerns the effect of higher efficiency on own and
competitor mark-up and output, respectively.
Assumption 5 Mi and Qi are both increasing in Yi and decreasing in Yj.
Assumption 5 states that an increase in own efficiency increases own
mark-up and output, and conversely for an increase in competitor efficiency.
The first part of the assumption is natural if higher efficiency does not only
decrease own costs, but also (weakly) increases the wholesale price, so that
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competitor costs increase. If, however, higher efficiency decreases the whole-
sale price, competitor cost reductions could, in principle, outweigh the posi-
tive effect of higher efficiency on own costs. The second part of the assump-
tion can be justified with similar arguments.
3.2 Relation to the Literature
Our reduced form set-up is motivated by various more specific models. In
particular, our crucial Assumption 4 is consistent with several models of
successive oligopolies, in which efficiency and/or foreclosure effects of vertical
integration have been identified.
For example, Salinger (1988) treats vertical integration decisions as ex-
ogenous. He considers a fixed-proportion linear Cournot model with arbi-
trary numbers of homogeneous firms. It turns out that integration always
causes an efficiency effect as it eliminates successive mark-ups. Whether in-
tegration also generates a foreclosure effect depends on parameter values.
Nevertheless, Assumption 4 is always satisfied in Salinger’s model. Analo-
gous statements hold for the modified Cournot model analyzed by Gaudet
and van Long (1996), where integrated firms purchase from the upstream
market to increase rivals costs, and integration decisions are endogenous.
Ordover et al. (1990) examine a fixed-proportion model with endogenous
integration decisions. Two upstream firms produce a homogenous input good
and compete in prices. In one version of their model, two downstream firms
produce differentiated products and compete in prices. Their model thus
rules out an efficiency effect of integration when the competitor is not inte-
grated.6 Similarly, there is a foreclosure effect only when the competitor is
not integrated.
Hart and Tirole (1990) analyze different variants of a model where two
upstream firms produce a homogenous input good and compete in prices,
whereas two downstream firms engage in Cournot competition.7 Non-linear
6Because of Bertrand competition upstream, there is an upstream (monopoly) mark-up
only when there is an integrated competitor.
7These variants differ with respect to the bargaining power pertaining to upstream and
downstream firms.
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contracts between upstream and downstream firms are allowed. In the so-
called ex post monopolization variant of the model, the more efficient up-
stream firm integrates with one of the downstream firms and slightly under-
cuts the less efficient upstream firm to supply the other downstream firm.
This results in an efficiency effect of integration. Integration has no foreclo-
sure effect, as it does not raise the downstream rival’s costs.
Chen (2001) examines a fixed-proportion model where two or more up-
stream firms produce a homogenous input good and may have different mar-
ginal costs, and two downstream firms produce differentiated final products
and compete in prices. This author also identifies an efficiency effect and,
depending on parameters, a foreclosure effect.
Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) provide a reduced-form analysis of com-
petition in successive oligopoly. They examine the causes of asymmetric
vertical integration and discuss the relation between a firm’s efficiency and
its integration incentive. They view the existence of a combined positive own
effect and adverse cross effect as the essential property of vertical integration.
Summing up, previous literature suggests that vertical integration is likely
to help gaining competitive advantage by cutting own costs or by raising
rivals’ costs.
3.3 Properties of Profit Functions
We now derive useful properties of the profit function Πi (V,Y). More specif-
ically, in Lemma 1 we show how investment incentives ∂Πi/∂Yi depend on
V and Y.
Lemma 1 (profit function properties) Suppose Assumptions 1-5 are sat-
isfied.
(i) Suppose that, in addition,
∂Q1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂Q1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) ; ∂M1∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂M1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) . (4)
Then
∂Π1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) > ∂Π1∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) . (5)
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(ii) Suppose that, in addition,
∂2Q1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0; ∂
2M1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0. (6)
Then
∂Πi/∂Yi is non-increasing in Y j for j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2 (7)
(iii) Suppose that, in addition,
∂Qi
∂Yi
, ∂Mi∂Yi
are non-decreasing in Vi and non-increasing in Vj. (8)
Then
∂Πi
∂Yi
is non-decreasing in Vi and non-increasing in Vj. (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us consider each part of Lemma 1, in turn.
Part (i) gives conditions for investment incentives to be higher for an in-
tegrated firm facing a separated competitor than for a separated firm facing
an integrated competitor. The intuition relies on Assumption 4 which says
that both mark-up and demand are higher for an integrated firm facing a
separated competitor than for a separated firm facing an integrated com-
petitor. Since higher mark-up means that demand increases resulting from
greater efficiency are more valuable, and higher demand means that mark-up
increases are more valuable, the benefits from vertical integration and cost-
reducing investment tend to reinforce each other. Put differently, there are
demand/mark-up complementarities in product market competition. As a re-
sult, an integrated firm with high mark-up typically finds it more beneficial
to invest into cost reduction than a separated competitor.
There is, however, a potential countervailing effect: The size of the de-
mand andmark-up increases associated with higher efficiency could, in princi-
ple, decrease with vertical integration. The additional conditions on ∂Qi/∂Yi
and ∂Mi/∂Yi exclude this possibility. We think these conditions are fairly
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natural, as higher downstream efficiency tends to increase the input price
due to higher demand (see Banerjee an Lin 2003), which, in turn, reduces
the output and mark-up increases resulting from higher transformation ef-
ficiency for a separated firm. This effect is clearly absent for an integrated
firm, at least if it does not buy from the input market. Further note that
the conditions on ∂Qi/∂Yi and ∂Mi/∂Yi are stronger than necessary. All we
require is that the demand/mark-up complementarities in the product mar-
ket dominate over any negative effect of vertical integration on ∂Qi/∂Yi and
∂Mi/∂Yi.
Part (ii) gives conditions for investment incentives to decrease when com-
petitors become more efficient. Intuitively, the changes of variables under
consideration (increases in Yi and decreases in Yj, respectively) lead to in-
creases in firm i’s demand and mark-up which are mutually reinforcing.
Again, there might be countereffects of Yi and Yj on ∂Qi/∂Yi and ∂Mi/∂Yj
that could upset the results. The additional conditions on the second partial
derivatives of Qi and Mi exclude this possibility.8
Part (iii) is closely related to part (i). Note that (8) is more restrictive
than (4). Using this more restrictive condition leads to a stronger implication:
(9) implies (5), but not vice versa.
With these properties of the profit functions in place, we now proceed to
study the firms’ investment and integration decisions in the second and the
first stage of the game, respectively.
3.4 Analyzing Cost-Reducing Investments
Consider the second stage of the game in which firms take simultaneous de-
cisions on cost-reducing investment. The first result generalizes Observation
1, showing how the investments of integrated and separated firms differ.
Proposition 1 Consider the subgame starting in stage 2. Suppose that, in
addition to Assumptions 1-5, (4) and (6) are satisfied. Then, the integrated
firm invests more into cost reduction than the separated firm, i.e. if Vk = 1
and Vc = 0, then Yk > Yc.
8In the linear Cournot example, these additional conditions are satisfied (see Table 1).
16
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that, if the firms differ only with respect to their
vertical integration status, the integrated firm will invest more into cost re-
duction than the separated firm. Intuitively, by Assumption 4, the integrated
firm has higher equilibrium demand and mark-up than its competitor. The
demand/mark-up complementarity therefore implies that the integrated firm
has higher incentives to invest than the separated competitor, as reflected in
(5). In addition, condition (7) implies that the higher investment of the
integrated firm and the lower investment of the competitor are mutually
reinforcing. Thus, integrated firms should invest more than separated firms.
To sum up, the observation that integrated firms tend to invest more
into cost reduction than separated firms should be expected to hold quite
generally, as it only requires fairly natural assumptions on product market
competition. Proposition 1 is consistent with the observation that integrated
firms tend to have high market shares: Not only does integration have a direct
efficiency effect which works towards higher market shares, but integrated
firms also tend to invest more into cost reduction.9
We now generalize Observation 2 and study the effect of a firm’s vertical
integration on both firms’ investments. This involves a comparison of the
firms’ investments under different market structures, whereas Proposition 1
was based on a comparison of investments within a given asymmetric vertical
market structure.
Proposition 2 Suppose that, in addition to Assumptions 1-5, conditions (6)
and (8) hold. Then the equilibrium level of Yi is non-decreasing in Vi and
non-increasing in Vj.
Proof. Apply Lemma 1 and Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5).
Intuitively, by (9), if one firm integrates, this increases its own investment
incentive, whereas it decreases the competitor’s investment incentive. Recall
that the negative effect on the competitor’s investment incentive is the in-
timidation effect of vertical integration. By (7), the positive effect on own
9Proposition 1 generalizes to more than two firms. The proof uses similar techniques
as the special case of two firms.
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investment and the (negative) on the competitor’s investment are mutually
reinforcing.
As argued in the justification of (6), there may be countereffects because
the size of the increases in output and mark-up resulting from integration
may depend on the efficiency levels as well. Also, as already noted, the re-
quired condition (8) is less general than the corresponding condition (4) for
Proposition 1: Condition (8) implies condition (4), but the converse state-
ment is not true.10 Nevertheless, Proposition 2 indicates that under fairly
natural assumptions, the finding that a firm’s vertical integration increases
own investment and decreases competitor investment generalizes beyond the
linear Cournot model.
3.5 Analyzing Integration Decisions
We now consider endogenous integration decisions in stage 1, accounting for
the induced effects on cost-reducing investment. To this end, we introduce
the following notation:
Notation 2 For f = Π, Q,M,
(i) let
f∗i (V) ≡ fi (V,Y(V)) , i = 1, 2,
describe equilibrium profits, outputs and mark-ups, respectively, as func-
tions of integration decisions (evaluated at the equilibrium choices of
cost-reducing investment).
(ii) let
∆f∗1 (V2) ≡ f∗1 (1,V2)−f∗1 (0,V2) ; ∆f∗2 (V1) ≡ f∗2 (V1, 1)−f∗2 (V1, 0)
denote the effect of vertical integration on equilibrium profits, outputs
and mark-ups, respectively, taking induced effects on efficiency levels
into account.
10Also, generalization of Proposition 2 to more than two firms requires additional
conditions.
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We introduce the following additional assumption.
Assumption 6 The firms’ equilibrium mark-ups and outputs satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) M∗i (V) and Q∗i (V) are non-decreasing in Vi.
(ii) M∗i (V) and Q∗i (V) are non-increasing in Vj.
Assumption 6 holds in our linear Cournot example (see Table 2 for the
special case k = 1). To understand why the assumption is plausible, recall
that V affects mark-ups and outputs both directly and indirectly, that is,
via Y(V). Intuitively, the direct effects already lend some plausibility to
assumption 6, but indirect effects via Y(V) reinforce them.
More specifically, consider condition (i): If Vi decreases ci, this should
support a direct positive effect on M∗i (V) and Q∗i (V). Also, Vi affects cj
by the impact on the wholesale price. If the wholesale price increases, the
marginal costs of a non-integrated firm j go up, and the wholesale price
effect will thus reinforce the direct efficiency effect.11 Importantly, there also
is an indirect intimidation effect of integration: As argued before, vertical
integration tends to reduce a competitor’s incentive to invest into efficiency
improvement, strengthening the direct positive effect of own integration on
output and mark-up.
Condition (ii) can be justified in a similar way: First, as firm j’s inte-
gration reduces its marginal costs, firm j becomes a stronger downstream
competitor, which reduces M∗i (V) and Q∗i (V) by way of downstream inter-
action. Second, after integration, the integrated upstream firm may have an
incentive to curtail supply to the input market, raising the costs of a non-
integrated rival by way of upstream interaction. This is the foreclosure effect
of vertical integration. Again, crucially, these direct effects are reinforced by
the indirect intimidation effect of vertical integration.
11Whether such vertical foreclosure emerges in equilibrium depends on subtle details of
the specific model under consideration: For instance, foreclosure will typically occur for
low numbers of upstream suppliers (Salinger 1988) or high costs of switching suppliers
(Chen 2001).
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Note that Assumption 6 holds in our linear Cournot model, even though
the direct effect of Vj onM∗i (V) andQ∗i (V) will typically have the wrong sign
for given Y. This illustrates that the intimidation effect of integration may
well dominate the direct effect. Put differently, cost-reducing downstream
investment makes the existence of demand/mark-up complementarities in
the product market even more likely than without investment.
Next, we (i) give conditions under which vertical integration decisions are
strategic substitutes (Proposition 3), and (ii) show that there will thus be
asymmetric equilibria where one firm integrates and the other stays separated
(Proposition 4). These results are related to Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 in
Buehler and Schmutzler (2005), where we abstracted from endogenous cost-
reducing investment, though.
Proposition 3 (strategic substitutes) Suppose Assumptions 1-6 hold. Fur-
ther assume that the following statement holds for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j:
∆Q∗i (Vj) and ∆M∗i (Vj) are non-increasing in Vj. (10)
Then vertical integration decisions are strategic substitutes, i.e.
∆Π∗i (0) ≥ ∆Π∗i (1) for i = 1, 2. (11)
Proof. By exchangeability, it suffices to consider firm 1’s incentive to
integrate, ∆Π∗1 (V2). Rewriting this profit differential yields
∆Π∗1 (V2) = Q∗1 (1, V2) ·∆M∗1 (V2) (12)
+M∗1 (0, V2) ·∆Q∗1 (V2) .
By Assumption 6(i), both ∆M∗1 (V2) and ∆Q∗1 (V2) are non-negative. By
Assumption 6(ii), Q∗1(1, V2) andM∗1 (0, V2) are both non-increasing in V2. By
(10), ∆M∗1 (V2) and ∆Q∗1 (V2) are non-increasing in V2. Thus (12) is non-
increasing in V2.
The intuition for the strategic substitutes property relies on the monotonic-
ity of M∗i and Q∗i in the integration variables. As we argued, this is likely
to be more pronounced than the corresponding property for Mi and Qi,
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which would justify strategic substitutes. Therefore, the observation from
the Cournot example that asymmetric integration arises for a larger parame-
ter interval when cost reductions are considered is not a coincidence.
Proposition 3 immediately implies that there may be asymmetric equilib-
ria where one firm integrates and the other remains separated, even if firms
start out identically and face the same exogenous integration costs.
Proposition 4 (asymmetric equilibria) Suppose the conditions of Propo-
sition 3 are satisfied, i.e. vertical integration decisions are strategic substi-
tutes. Then, for suitable values of F , there exist equilibria where exactly one
firm integrates (∆Π∗i (0) ≥ F ≥ ∆Π∗i (1)).
Proof. If integration decisions are strategic substitutes, we must have
∆Π∗i (0) ≥ F ≥ ∆Π∗i (1) for suitable values of F .
Intuitively, Proposition 4 states that, if vertical integration decisions are
strategic substitutes, then there must be levels of acquisition costs where
integration is profitable for only one of the firms.
Propositions 3 and 4 together give a very intuitive rationale why asym-
metric vertical integration equilibria might emerge. However, there are two
caveats. First, the strategic substitutes condition may be violated if there is
a strong foreclosure effect, as firm i will then have relatively high (low) costs
when it is separated (integrated, respectively). Thus, firm i’s cost reduction
from integration is likely to be higher when firm j is integrated. If inte-
gration decisions are strategic complements rather than substitutes, vertical
integration by firm j renders vertical integration more profitable for firm i
(i.e. ∆Π∗i (1;Y) > ∆Π∗i (0;Y)). As a result, only symmetric equilibria can
exist: Either both firms integrate or none. Second, even if integration deci-
sions are strategic substitutes, symmetric equilibria will still arise when F is
so high that F > ∆Π∗i (0): Then, no firm will integrate. Similarly, when F
is so low that F < ∆Π∗i (1), all firms integrate.
4 Conclusions
We have examined the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-
reducing downstream investment in a model of successive oligopoly. Our
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main findings are the following:
First, vertical integration tends to increase (decrease) the integrating
firm’s (competitor’s) investment incentive. We call the adverse effect on
the competitor’s investment incentive the intimidation effect of vertical in-
tegration. The effect is economically relevant in the sense that it may well
dominate the direct effect of integration on the firms’ outputs and mark-ups.
The intimidation effect of vertical integration implies that there is a strategic
incentive to integrate. In particular, vertical integration may serve as a top
dog strategy, tapering the competitor’s cost-reducing investment.
Second, the strategic integration incentive is likely to be larger for a firm
facing a separated (rather than integrated) competitor. Therefore, asym-
metric equilibria typically involve large integrated firms and small separated
firms. This is in line with the market structure of a number of industries
discussed in the literature.
Third, our analysis suggests an intuitive explanation for the initial dif-
ference between a (vertically integrated) leader and a (vertically separated)
laggard in an investment game potentially leading to endogenous market
dominance.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Differentiating firm 1’s profit function yields
∂Π1
∂Y1
=
∂Q1
∂Y1
M1 +
∂M1
∂Y1
Q1.
Using Assumption 5, all terms on the r.h.s. of this equation are positive,
and both M1 (1, 0;Y) > M1 (0, 1;Y) and Q1 (1, 0;Y) > Q1 (0, 1;Y). (5)
thus follows immediately from
∂Q1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) ≥ ∂Q1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) and
∂M1
∂Y1
(1, 0; (Y)) ≥ ∂M1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) .
(ii) Using
∂2Q1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0, ∂
2M1
∂Y1∂Y2
≤ 0,
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arguments similar to those used in the proof of (i) show that ∂2Π1/∂Y1∂Y2 ≤
0. (7) thus follows immediately.
(iii) is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) By (5) and exchangeability (Assumption 3), we have
∂Π2
∂Y2
(0, 1;Y ) =
∂Π1
∂Y1
(1, 0;Y) >
∂Π1
∂Y1
(0, 1;Y) =
∂Π2
∂Y2
(1, 0;Y) . (13)
Now, define θ = (V1, V2) and x1 = Y1, x2 = −Y2. Thus, consider the game
with objective function
fi (x1, x2; θ) = Πi (θ;x1,−x2)−Ki (|xi|) .
By (7), this game is supermodular.12 By (5), changing θ from (0, 1) to (1, 0)
increases ∂Π1/∂Y1 and reduces ∂Π2/∂Y2. In other words, Πi has increasing
differences in (θ, x). Thus, the result follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom
and Roberts (1990).
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Figure 2: Investments and market shares in the linear Cournot model (α =
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